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Abstract Laudisa (Found Phys 38:1110–1132, 2008) claims that experimen-
tal research on the class of non-local hidden-variable theories introduced by
Leggett is misguided, because these theories are irrelevant for the founda-
tions of quantum mechanics. I show that Laudisa’s arguments fail to estab-
lish the pessimistic conclusion he draws from them. In particular, it is not
the case that Leggett-inspired research is based on a mistaken understand-
ing of Bell’s theorem, nor that previous no-hidden-variable theorems already
exclude Leggett’s models. Finally, I argue that the framework of Bohmian
mechanics brings out the importance of Leggett tests, rather than proving
their irrelevance, as Laudisa supposes.
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1 Introduction
Throughout the debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, the “or-
thodox” view has affirmed the impossibility of completing quantum mechan-
ics by means of hidden variables. One way to understand the significance of
John S. Bell’s groundbreaking 1964 paper [2] is to say that Bell managed to
turn this dogma into an (in principle) empirically testable claim, at least for
the class of hidden-variable theories satisfying a certain locality constraint.
As is well known, subsequent experiments have vindicated the predictions of
quantum mechanics and ruled out local hidden-variable theories. Meanwhile,
hidden-variable theories without a locality assumption are not excluded by
Bell’s theorem.
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2This has inspired attempts to go beyond Bell’s result by proposing ex-
perimental tests also for some classes of non-local hidden-variable theories.
The present paper discusses one such attempt, carried out by A. J. Leggett
in 2003 [15]. Leggett introduced a class of non-local hidden-variable theo-
ries which he calls crypto-nonlocal theories and which predict violations of
Bell’s inequalities, hence they are not excluded by Bell’s theorem. However,
Leggett showed that they imply a different set of inequalities (henceforth
called Leggett’s inequalities), which were subsequently tested in experiments
[6,12]. The results displayed violations of Leggett’s inequalities, in accordance
with quantum mechanical predictions. Therefore, Leggett’s crypto-nonlocal
theories share the fate of local hidden-variable theories: They are ruled out
on empirical grounds.
The question now is whether these results tell us anything interesting
about the nature of the subatomic world or about the foundations of quan-
tum mechanics. Federico Laudisa [14, p. 1112] vehemently denies that they
do. More specifically, Laudisa calls Leggett’s approach an “implausible re-
search program” and his theories “totally irrelevant from the viewpoint of
the foundations of quantum mechanics”. In a nutshell, the arguments leading
to this scathing judgment are the following:
1. Leggett’s work starts with a mistaken interpretation of Bell’s theorem.
2. His theories are already ruled out by well-known no-go theorems of the
Gleason-Bell-Kochen-Specker type, so there is no point in testing them
experimentally.
3. The consistency of Bohmian mechanics directly refutes Leggett’s claims.
The present paper will scrutinize Laudisa’s arguments. To set the stage,
section 2 gives a brief introduction to Leggett’s theories. In section 3, I will
argue that Laudisa’s first claim, while correct, fails to establish the conclusion
he draws from it. Sections 4 and 5 will dispute Laudisa’s second claim on
theoretical as well as on experimental grounds. Finally, section 6 will show
that Laudisa’s third claim is not only false, but has things back to front:
Far from proving the irrelevance of Leggett-inspired experiments, Bohmian
mechanics actually brings out their foundational significance.
2 Leggett’s Non-Local Hidden-Variable Theories
Leggett considers an EPR/Bohm-type situation with polarization-entangled
photon pairs. The measuring apparatus in each wing of the experiment con-
sists of a polarizer (characterized by a transmission axis a for the left wing
and b for the right wing, respectively) and a detector which registers the pho-
ton if it is transmitted (rather than absorbed) by the polarizer.1 Accordingly,
the measurement outcomes A (left detector) and B (right detector) can take
one of the two values +1 and −1, depending on whether the detector does or
does not register the photon. Leggett now constructs a hidden-variable the-
ory in which each photon pair is characterized by a variable λ and a pair of
1 Leggett’s results can be proved for general (elliptical) polarization [15, sec. 4],
but for the conceptual points I am discussing here, it is sufficient to look at the
simpler case of linear polarization.
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difference between such a theory and standard quantum mechanics appears
in cases which the latter describes as photon pairs of “indefinite polarization”
(e.g., in the so-called singlet state). In contrast to standard quantum me-
chanics, a Leggett-type theory assumes that each photon pair has a definite
polarization, such that the complete ensemble of photon pairs emitted in a
series of emission events is a disjoint union of subensembles of definite po-
larization. In other words, subensembles are characterized by unique values
for u and v. Photon pairs within a given subensemble can, however, have
different λ, where the probability distribution for the λ’s is given by ρuv(λ).
Due to Bell’s theorem, such a model can only reproduce the quantum
mechanical predictions if it incorporates some kind of non-locality. Within
Leggett’s theory, the outcomes A and B are therefore allowed to depend not
only on the local, but also on the distant parameters:
A = A(λ,u,v,a,b); B = B(λ,u,v,a,b). (1)
If things were kept as general as that, nothing interesting would follow from
the assumption of definite polarizations within the subensembles. The cru-
cial constraint is therefore the following assumption, which states that the
subensemble averages of A and B (i.e., the averages over all values of λ within
a given subensemble) depend only on the local variables:
A¯
.
=
∫
ρuv(λ)A(λ,u,v,a,b)dλ = 2(u · a)2 − 1 = A¯(u,a), (2a)
B¯
.
=
∫
ρuv(λ)B(λ,u,v,a,b)dλ = 2(v · b)2 − 1 = B¯(v,b). (2b)
Although this is a kind of locality assumption, it is weaker than the as-
sumption from which Bell-type inequalities are derived. Indeed, Leggett [15,
sec. 5] shows that a model can satisfy (2) and yet violate Bell’s inequalities.
Therefore, Leggett-type models are not excluded by Bell tests. This raises
the question whether they are compatible with all quantum mechanical pre-
dictions. The central result of [15] is that they are not. In analogy with Bell’s
reasoning, Leggett derives from (2) an inequality which is violated by certain
quantum states, thus opening the way to experimental tests of his theories.
Performing the relevant experiments, Gröblacher et al. [12] and Branciard et
al. [6] confirmed the violations of Leggett’s inequalities predicted by quantum
mechanics.
No one (to my knowledge) disputes the correctness of these results, but,
as we have seen in the introduction, Laudisa claims that they have no foun-
dational significance whatsoever. Before turning to the investigation of Laud-
isa’s arguments, I should mention that Leggett’s results have more recently
been generalized in several ways [5,8,9]. It might thus seem interesting to
evaluate Laudisa’s arguments in the context of these newer developments.
However, if what I argue below is correct, then this is unnecessary: My ba-
sic claim is that even the original results obtained by Leggett, Gröblacher
etc. have some foundational significance. But it is obvious that the later, more
general results have at least as much foundational significance as the original,
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Leggett’s original models, they will fail even more dramatically with respect
to the more general models developed later. I therefore restrict my discussion
to the original Leggett models except for some brief side remarks on later
developments (see footnotes 2 and 7 below).
3 Bell, Leggett, and “Local Realism”
The bulk of Laudisa’s paper [14] is devoted to showing that Leggett and his
followers (in particular the authors of [12]) start from a mistaken interpreta-
tion of Bell’s theorem, which I shall call the LR view. Adherents of this view
believe that Bell’s theorem is based on two independent assumptions, locality
and realism, and that the violations of Bell’s inequalities therefore force us
to give up at least one of these assumptions. Laudisa is not alone in criticiz-
ing this conception [11,16,17], and I fully subscribe to the criticism, which
may be summarized as follows: Proponents of the LR view either fail to tell
us what they mean by “realism” or they use the term to denote something
which is demonstrably not an independent assumption of Bell’s theorem. If
anything, realism is inferred in Bell’s derivation, not assumed.
However, from the fact that the LR view is mistaken and that Legett,
Gröblacher etc. seem to hold it, it does not follow that research on Leggett’s
theories is misguided. This would only be the case if the development and the
investigation of these theories depended on the LR conception. That there
is probably no such dependence can be seen already from the fact that one
of the above-mentioned critics of the LR view [11] co-authored one of the
papers reporting experimental tests of Leggett’s theories [6].
More generally, the following line of thought shows that one can reject
the LR conception and still be interested in Legget-type theories: Once we
recognize that Bell did not assume realism for the derivation of his theorem,
we see that the LR view is mistaken in suggesting that the violations of
Bell’s inequalities leave us with a choice to give up either locality or realism.
Instead, they simply force us to give up locality. But this leaves open the
question whether there is a sense of realism which has to be given up as well.
Leggett can therefore be interpreted as investigating theories which give up
locality (in accordance with the correct interpretation of Bell’s theorem) but
hold on to realism in the sense of condition (2).
I do not claim that this is how Leggett himself views the significance of his
models. Indeed, some remarks in the first and the last section of [15] indicate
his sympathy for the LR inspired view that the ruling out of his non-local
realistic theories supports the idea of giving up realism instead of locality. If
the LR view is false (as I think it is), then such a conclusion is untenable,
because Bell’s theorem already rules out all local theories, be they realistic
(in whatever sense) or not. But Leggett’s problematic conclusion can easily
be dissociated from his research program: The investigation of Leggett-type
models need not be seen as a test between non-local realism and local non-
realism (whatever that may mean). Instead, we should see it as a test between
two kinds of non-local theories, those which respect (2) and those which do
not. If one wants to stick to the LR terminology, one may call these theories
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are not very helpful,2 except perhaps to drive home the point that there is
a sense in which the investigation of non-local realistic theories, as proposed
by Leggett, is perfectly acceptable even for the opponent of the LR view.
4 Leggett’s Models and the Kochen-Specker Theorem
Laudisa’s second reason to question the significance of testing Leggett-type
theories is that their realism assumption (which he denotes by RealismG&al,
the subscript referring to Gröblacher et al.) already dooms them to failure
in the light of previous no-hidden-variable theorems.
If RealismG&al were an independent assumption of any hidden vari-
able theory, Gleason-Bell-Kochen & Specker would have already proved
their incompatibility with quantum mechanics needless of any locality
requirement. [14, pp. 1122–1123]
Unfortunately, Laudisa here falls into the very trap that often undermines
the intelligibility of the LR view: the use of an insufficiently precise notion of
“realism”. The conception of realism which he attributes to Gröblacher et al.
includes non-contextuality in the following sense: “The physical systems under
scrutiny are endowed with preexisting properties that do not depend essen-
tially on the measurement interactions the systems themselves may undergo”
[14, p. 1113]. If this is understood such that individual measurement outcomes
are independent of what other measurements are made simultaneously, then
it is indeed a form of non-contextuality which is incompatible with quantum
mechanics, as shown by the (Gleason-Bell-)Kochen-Specker theorem.3 But
do Gröblacher et al. really assume this kind of non-contextuality? At first
sight, it seems that they do, by assuming that “all measurement outcomes are
determined by pre-existing properties of particles independent of the mea-
surement (realism)” [12, p. 872]. But just two sentences later they add that
“measurement outcomes may very well depend on parameters in space-like
separated regions”. And if one looks what condition of non-contextuality they
actually use in their derivation, then it turns out that it is non-contextuality
on the subensemble level, as spelled out in (2). This is compatible with a fail-
ure of non-contextuality on the level of individual measurements, as expressed
in (1). Since the Kochen-Specker theorem only rules out theories which are
non-contextual in this latter sense, it has nothing to say about the Leggett-
type theories investigated by Gröblacher et al. In fact, it is rather surprising
that Laudisa should have missed the importance of distinguishing the indi-
vidual level from the (sub-)ensemble level when discussing non-contextuality,
2 One of the reasons why the LR terminology is unhelpful is that it obscures the
fact that (2) is itself a kind of locality condition. This is reflected in the more ap-
propriate terminology introduced by Colbeck and Renner [8], who classify Leggett’s
models as models for which the hidden variables have both a local and a global part,
as opposed to entirely nonlocal models. This distinction forms the basis of Colbeck’s
and Renner’s generalization of Leggett’s results: As they demonstrate, all models
having a nontrivial local part (not just those which satisfy the particular condition
(2)) are incompatible with quantum mechanical predictions.
3 For a concise presentation of the essential part of the theorem, see [3, sec. 5].
6because in an earlier paper [13, pp. 492–493] he himself used precisely this
distinction to show why neither Bell’s hypothetical local hidden-variable the-
ory [2] nor Bohm’s theory [4] fall prey to the existing no-go theorems for
non-contextual hidden-variable theories.
5 The Significance of Experimental Tests
The previous section has shown that the theorems cited by Laudisa do not
suffice to establish the incompatibility between Leggett’s models and quan-
tum mechanics; the incompatibility only manifests itself through Leggett’s
inequality and its violation by quantum mechanical predictions. These con-
flicting predictions can then be tested in experiments. But again, Laudisa
[14, p. 1123] disputes the significance of such tests. Immediately following
the sentence quoted above, he writes:
But, as Bell showed, there is little significance in testing against quan-
tum theory a theory (be it local or non-local) that is supposed to
satisfy a condition that we already know quantum mechanics cannot
possibly and reasonably satisfy.
I am not convinced by this reasoning. Indeed, the best counterexamples to
this claim are Bell’s inequalities themselves. The fact that these inequalities
are violated by the quantum mechanical predictions shows that quantum
mechanics “cannot possibly and reasonably satisfy” the conditions assumed
for their derivation. Should we therefore conclude that Aspect’s experiments
(to name just the most famous example) are of “little significance”? This
would amount to a dubious a priori commitment to the truth of quantum
mechanical predictions in domains where quantum mechanics has not yet
been tested.
I suspect that Laudisa fails to appreciate the force of this counterexample
because he does not properly distinguish between theoretical and experimen-
tal aspects of Bell’s theorem. This can be seen by analyzing the following
extract from what Laudisa offers as the logical reconstruction of the Bell-
Clauser-Horne argument. (The complete argument includes six steps, but we
only need to look at steps 2 to 4; here “QM” stands for “the assumption of
the validity of the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics” [14, p. 1124],
while “BI” denotes Bell’s inequalities.)
2. QM → ¬BI [Experimental fact]
3. QM [Assumption]
4. ¬BI [2, 3 Modus ponens]
[14, p. 1127; square brackets in the original]
This way of putting things strikes me as thoroughly confused. First of all, the
conditional in step 2 is not an experimental fact. That quantum mechanical
predictions violate Bell’s inequalities can be derived (and is in fact derived
by Clauser et al. [7]) on a purely theoretical basis, without the need for any
experiment. What is an experimental fact is the observed violation of Bell’s
inequalities, for example in Aspect’s experiment [1], as expressed in step 4.
By presenting this step as the result of a modus ponens, Laudisa creates
7the false impression that one needs to assume the truth of QM (step 3) in
order to conclude that Bell’s inequalities are violated. Now it is true that,
as a matter of practical fact, a commitment to some well-established parts
of QM (concerning, for example, the production of entangled particle pairs)
is involved in performing a Bell-type experiment. And it is also true that,
historically, most performers of Bell tests expected all quantum mechanical
predictions to turn out correct.4 But no assumption of the correctness of QM
(in the sense that would logically imply violations of Bell’s inequalities, as in
Laudisa’s step 4) is involved in performing these experiments. The very point
of carrying out a Bell-test is to treat the correctness of theoretical predictions
regarding BI as an open question, to be decided by experiment, rather than
to be derived from our preconceived assumptions. This is how the result ¬BI
is obtained.
6 Leggett-Type Theories and Bohmian Mechanics
As a final argument against Leggett’s approach, Laudisa [14, p. 1129] cites
the consistency of Bohmian mechanics and claims that this “directly refutes
the claims of Leggett and followers”. His idea seems to be that Bohmian
mechanics, by being a hidden-variable theory which is consistent with all
quantum mechanical predictions (and all empirical data), somehow invali-
dates Leggett’s claim that the hidden-variable theories he investigates are
in conflict with some quantum mechanical predictions (and with some pos-
sible empirical data). But of course, Bohmian mechanics could only serve
as a counterexample in this sense if it belonged to the class of Leggett-type
theories. Laudisa seems to believe that it does, as he claims that “Bohmian
mechanics satisfies RealismG&al” [ibid.], but this is clearly false.5 As de-
scribed above, an essential component of RealismG&al is the commitment
to a definite polarization of each photon, giving rise to the subensembles un-
derlying (2). Bohmian mechanics, by contrast, does not regard polarization
as a property of individual particles, and it is therefore not a realisticG&al
theory. Put in terms of hidden variables, the difference between Bohmian
mechanics and a Leggett-type theory is that the two theories are committed
to different hidden variables: position in the first case, polarization in the
second.
While it is thus unjustified to view Bohmian mechanics as directly refuting
Leggett’s approach, a certain tension between the two cannot be denied. In
particular, from a Bohmian perspective, it amounts to “naive realism” [10] to
treat as real any property other than position. But it is at least conceivable
that the Bohmian perspective—whithin which position takes priority over all
other properties—is not the only possible way to construct a hidden-variable
4 A relevant counterexample is John Clauser, who seems to have been gen-
uinely convinced that Bell tests were going to disprove quantum mechanics (see
[18, p. 160].
5 It should be false even by Laudisa’s own lights: Since he is convinced that
RealismG&al is an unreasonable assumption [14, p. 1128], satisfying it would make
Bohmian mechanics an unreasonable theory, which is certainly not what he wants
to claim.
8theory. More specifically, if we speak about photons (which not even Bohmian
mechanics describes as continuously localized particles), there is no a priori
reason why we should regard position as a more fundamental property than
polarization. Leggett’s proposal can then be seen as an attempt to explore the
empirical consequences of an alternative to the Bohmian perspective. Under
this interpretation, Bohmian mechanics actually brings out the relevance of
Leggett-inspired research, instead of making it obsolete, as Laudisa supposes.
Let me explain this by once more highlighting the parallel between Leggett’s
and Bell’s inequalities. A frequently heard complaint about Bohmian me-
chanics is that it is non-local. The correct response to this is to refer to the
experimental violations of Bell’s inequalities, which show that non-locality is
not a peculiarity of Bohmian mechanics, but an experimental fact. In a par-
allel fashion, experimental violations of Leggett’s inequalities furnish a reply
to another complaint that is sometimes made against Bohmian mechanics,
namely its non-realism with respect to all properties except position.6 Ex-
perimental tests of Leggett-type models support the Bohmian approach by
demonstrating that a realism about polarization, even in the modest sense of
(2), is in conflict with empirical data.7 The Bohmian should therefore not join
Laudisa in denouncing Leggett’s research program as irrelevant, but should
rather welcome it as significantly supporting his own position, by showing
that non-realism about the polarization of individual photons is not just a
theoretical postulate, but an experimental fact.
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